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Lauren Smedley was an associate at the
law firm of Capps, Staples, Ward, Has-
tings & Dodson. She began working there
on April 4, 1990. She was discharged on
April 1, 1991, shortly after an article ap-
peared in The Daily Journal, a legal news-
paper in the San Francisco Bay area,
quoting Smedley about "being out" at
work in an article about the Bay Area
Lesbian Feminist Bar Association, an or-
ganization of which she was an officer.
According to Smedley, she had previously
received a note from one of the firm's
partners, stating that "given our clientele
it would not be appropriate to discuss
lesbian rights, groups, activities, etc," The
firm apparently found out she was a les-
bian when an employee distributing
paychecks noticed a photograph of Smed-
ley and her lesbian companion on Smed-
ley's desk. The firm had never previously
knowingly employed a lesbian or gay at-
torney.
Had this all happened twenty years
ago, Smedley would have had no basis for
legal redress, for the law had barely begun
to address issues of sexual orientation and
the workplace. But in 1979, the California
Supreme Court ruled in Gay Law Stu-
dents Association v. Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Company^ that Section 1101
of the state's Labor Code, protecting Cali-
fornia employees from retaliation for their
political activities, should be interpreted
to protect lesbian and gay employees from
discrimination, California thus became
the first state in which lesbian and gay
employees would be protected as a matter
of state law, (The District of Columbia
had previously included "sexual orienta-
tion" in its employment discrimination
ordinance,^) After her discharge, Smedley
filed suit under a variety of legal theories,
including violation of Section 1101, Her
case is pending in the U,S, District Court
for the Northern District of California,^
In 1992, after two successive governors
vetoed attempts by the legislature to
amend California's Fair Employment and
Housing Code to make such protection
explicit, the legislature amended the La-
bor Code to codify the Gay Law Students
decision and make clear that it applied to
all California employers,"* By that time,
California was joining a growing list of
states expressly banning sexual orienta-
tion discrimination.
State Laws Proliferating
When California's Supreme Court first
ruled on the issue in 1979, a bare handful
of local ordinances and executive orders
protected lesbian and gay employees,
some applying only to the public sector.
' 24 Cal, 3d 458,156 Cal, Rptr, 14, 595 P,2d 592 (1979),
2 DC, Code Ann, Sec, l-2541(c)(1977),
^ Smedley v. Capps, Staples, Ward, Hastings & Dodson,
61 FEP 1360,1993 Westlaw 170409 (N,D, Cal, 1993),
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The California ruling came at a time
when public attention to this issue was
being stirred by ballot measures seeking
repeal of local "gay rights" ordinances,
most prominently in Dade County, Flor-
ida, where singer Anita Bryant success-
fully led a religiously inspired repeal
crusade in 1977. Despite several such ref-
erendum setbacks, the movement to ex-
tend protection to lesbian and gay
employees was picking up steam at that
time, with several major cities passing
civil rights ordinances and the state of
Wisconsin becoming the first to legislate
on the subject in 1981.^
Then the epidemic of Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) hit the
gay community, and political efforts were
diverted to securing government funding
for treatment, research, and prevention
activities. Although activists continued
the struggle to pass local ordinances, less
effort was expended on statewide bills. In
1986, however, after the Supreme Court
ruled in Bowers v. Hardwick^ that the
constitutional right of privacy did not
prevent states from criminalizing homo-
sexual intercourse, the gay rights move-
ment was jolted into renewed political
action. State lobbying efforts were re-
vived, and soon the pace of enactment of
state laws forbidding sexual orientation
discrimination picked up dramatically:
Massachusetts^ in 1989, Connecticut* and
Hawaii^ in 1991, California,1° New
Jersey," and Vermont'^ in 1992, and
Minnesota^^ early in 1993, with serious
legislative efforts pending in New York,
Rhode Island, and Washington State as
this was written in June 1993.
By June 1, 1993, approximately 23 per-
cent of the United States population lived
in states (including the District of Colum-
bia) where it was unlawful for employers
to discriminate on the basis of sexual ori-
entation as a matter of state law. Some of
those laws also extended to employers per-
forming contracts for the state, and thus
might have extraterritorial impact.
In ten states (comprising about 40 per-
cent of the population), sexual orientation
discrimination in state executive branch
employment was also forbidden by execu-
tive order of the governor. These states
include Colorado, Louisiana, Minnesota,
New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wash-
ington.
Local Laws Proliferating Even Faster
The increasing pace of enactment of
laws forbidding sexual orientation dis-
crimination at the state level followed an
earlier trend of passage of such laws at the
local level. Shortly after the American
Psychiatric Association adopted its his-
toric 1973 statement that homosexuality
was not a mental illness, lobbyists for
adding "sexual orientation" to local civil
rights ordinances began to achieve local
victories. Although there were some set-
backs, beginning with the 1977 Dade
County referendum mentioned previously,
the pace of enactment of such laws accel-
erated sharply through the 1980s, and
now they are being passed at the rate of
one or more each month. Most are munici-
pal ordinances, although in some cases
they are enacted by county governments.
Unfortunately, labor law reporting ser-
vices do not systematically collect and
publish local laws, and treatises on em-
ployment discrimination either ignore
them or only mention those enacted by
the largest cities. Consequently, employ-
ers and attorneys researching this issue
have to fall back on direct inquiries to
local government offices or lesbian and
gay rights organizations that attempt to
maintain up-to-date lists. Perhaps the
5 Wise. Stat. Ann. Sec. 111.36(1981).
^478 U.S. 186(1986).
' Mass. Gen. Laws, Ch. 151B, Sec. 3(6) (1989).
8 Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 46a.81(c) (1991).
' Haw. Rev. Stat. Sec. 368-1, 378-2 (1991).
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" N.J. Stat. Ann. Sec. 10:5-4 (1991).
'2 Vt. Stat. Ann. Til. 3, Sec. 961(6) (1992).
'3 Minn. Stat. Sec. 363.01-363.15 (1993).
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most reliable source for a reasonably up-
to-date list is the Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc.,''' a national
lesbian and gay rights public interest law
firm.
As of June 15, 1993, thirty-one of the
fifty largest cities by population had laws
banning discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, with most applicable
to private sector employers. This included
seven of the ten largest cities; the three
largest cities without such laws are in
Texas. The seven cities are New York, Los
Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Di-
ego, Detroit, and Phoenix. Other major
cities (from the top fifty by population)
with such laws include Atlanta, Austin,
Baltimore, Boston, Cincinnati, Columbus,
Denver, Honolulu, Kansas City (Mis-
souri), Long Beach, Milwaukee, Minneap-
olis, New Orleans, Oakland, Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh, Portland (Oregon), Sacra-
mento, San Francisco, San Jose, Seattle,
and Tucson.
Because of municipal and county ordi-
nances, in some jurisdictions that lack
state sexual orientation discrimination
laws most citizens are covered by discrim-
ination bans. In New York state, for ex-
ample, ten cities (including New York
City, which comprises five counties) and
two counties, with a total population com-
prising well over half of the state's re-
sidents, ban sexual orientation
discrimination in employment, with all
but a few of those policies applicable to
private sector employers.
In California, on the other hand, an
intermediate appellate court recently
ruled in Delaney v. Superior Fast
Freight^^ that the state's Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Code, which does not
cover sexual orientation, preempts the
seventeen municipal ordinances that deal
with this subject. The California Supreme
Court denied review of the case, giving it
the imprimatur of a state-wide precedent.
However, as the court in Delaney ob-
served, the 1992 amendment of the Labor
Code created protection against sexual
orientation discrimination outside the
purview of the Fair Employment and
Housing Code, so such protection remains
as a matter of state law in all those mu-
nicipalities. Moreover, on August 17 the
California Supreme Court agreed to hear
an appeal in three consolidated cases,
under the name Runkle v. Superior Court,
from decisions by a San Francisco Supe-
rior Court judge dismissing complaints
under the San Francisco municipal
human rights law in reliance on Delaney.
Apparently, the California Supreme
Court will be addressing this issue after
all, and Delaney is not the last word on
the preemption issue.
If all state, county, and local laws and
policies are added together, it appears
that the number of United States re-
sidents either living in jurisdictions for-
bidding such discrimination or working in
jobs subject to such rules approaches half
the population. An exact figure is difficult
to determine, because some local laws also
apply to government contractors and may
have extraterritorial effect as a result.
What Does "Sexual Orientation"
Mean?
Although some of these laws use the
older nomenclature of "sexual preference"
or "affectional preference," almost all
laws on the subject now use the term
"sexual orientation" in describing the
characteristic as to which discrimination
is forbidden. Many of the laws define
"sexual orientation" to mean "homosexu-
ality, bisexuality, or heterosexuality,"
without further explanation. Some laws,
reacting to specific concerns of legislators
responding to recent hot news items, also
specify certain people whom the laws are
not intended to protect. For example, the
Massachusetts law, enacted shortly after
a major FBI action against the North
'*666 Broadway, 12th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10012;
212-995-8585.
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American Man-Boy Love Association, a
pedophile organization, specifies that sex-
ual orientation "shall not include persons
whose sexual orientation involves minor
children as the sex object," '^ The 1993
Minnesota law contains a similar express
exclusion from coverage,'^
The Minnesota law provides perhaps
the most detailed description of what cov-
erage is intended: " 'Sexual orientation
means having or being perceived as hav-
ing an emotional, physical, or sexual at-
tachment to another person without
regard to the sex of that person or having
or being perceived as having an orienta-
tion for such attachment, or having or
being perceived as having a self-image or
identity not traditionally associated with
one's biological maleness or female-
ness," '^ In fact, this definition goes be-
yond what a sexologist would consider to
be "sexual orientation" and appears possi-
bly to include transvestism and transsexu-
alism, characteristics that are distinct
from sexual orientation and are not nor-
mally considered to be covered by sex or
sexual orientation discrimination
It is important in thinking about the
scope of coverage of sexual orientation
laws to recognize the distinctions between
sexual orientation, core gender identity,
and gender role, as these terms are used
by scientists concerned with human sexu-
ality, A good discussion of these concepts
in terms understandable by the lay reader
can be found in a useful book by Dr,
James Weinrich, Sexual Landscapes: Why
We Are What We Are, Why We Love
Whom We Love (1987), The brief sum-
mary that follows uses terminology and
concepts from Dr. Weinrich's book, A de-
tailed review of the history and current
state of knowledge about human sexuality
can be fouhd in the first three chapters of
Judge Richard Posner's recent book. Sex
and Reason (1992).
Core gender identity refers to the de-
gree to which an individual's self-identity
is consonant with his or her biological
gender. The tiny proportion of the popula-
tion which is "transposed" on the element
of core gender identity is sometimes la-
belled "transsexual," Transsexuality has
no necessary correlation with a particular
sexual orientation. Some transsexuals are
sexually attracted to members of the op-
posite sex, some to members of the same
sex.
Gender role refers to the degree to
which an individual is comfortable behav-
ing and dressing in a manner that society
deems appropriate for his or her biological
gender. Someone who is "transposed" on
this element and desires to cross-dress is
called a "transvestite," Once again, there
is no necessary correlation between a
strong desire to cross-dress and sexual ori-
entation. Many male transvestites who
prefer feminine or sexually-ambiguous
clothes are nonetheless heterosexual in ori-
entation, as are many women who prefer
traditionally masculine clothes.
Finally, sexual orientation refers to the
direction or orientation of an individual's
erotic attraction and has no necessary cor-
relation with a desire to cross-dress or to
assume the identity of the opposite gender
through sex-reassignment surgery. Every-
body has a sexual orientation, and, as Dr,
Alfred Kinsey discovered in his wide-rang-
ing research during the 1930s and
1940s,2° a surprisingly large percentage of
the adult population might be character-
ized by some degree of bisexuality in its
orientation, whether measured by sexual
fantasies or actual behavior.
Understanding of these concepts makes
clear that sexual orientation laws do not
"' Mass, Gen, Laws, Ann, Ch, I51B, Sec, 4 (1989),
" Minn, Stat, Sec, 363,01(45) (1993),
'8 Minn, Stat, Sec, 363,01(45) (1993),
" See, e,g,, DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone, 608 F,2d 327
(9th Cir, 1979), and cases cited therein.
Sexual Orientation
^ Alfred C, Kinsey et al,. Sexual Behavior in the Human
Male (1948); Alfred C, Kinsey et al,. Sexual Behavior in the
Human Female (1953),
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necessarily have any application to dis-
crimination based on transvestism or
transsexualism (barring the unusual sort
of definition contained in the recent Min-
nesota law), and, by the same token, that
they are not solely intended to protect
lesbians and gay men from discrimina-
tion. Rather, sexual orientation laws are
intended to make sexual orientation
(whether heterosexual, bisexual, or homo-
sexual) irrelevant to those employment
situations where having a particular sex-
ual orientation is not a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification. Thus, in a jurisdiction
that fails to ban employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation, a
heterosexual person who suffers discrimi-
nation because he is perceived to be gay
or bisexual would have no protection and
neither would a heterosexual who suffers
discrimination because he is not
Which Employers Are Covered?
Sexual orientation discrimination laws
also differ with respect to employer cover-
age. Sometimes, small firms are exempted
from coverage. Religious and religiously
affiliated institutions may claim varying
degrees of exemption based on constitu-
tional free exercise of religion arguments
and express statutory exemptions. When
the Massachusetts Law Against Discrimi-
nation was amended to add "sexual orien-
tation" in 1989, the legislature also
amended the law to provide a broad relig-
ious exemption applicable to all categories
of discrimination. While this was immedi-
ately responsive to political concerns in
gaining enactment of the law, it also may
reflect the prior Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court decision in Madsen v. Er-
win^ which held that The Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, a church-affiliated
newspaper, was privileged by the First
Amendment to discharge a reporter after
discovering that she was a lesbian.
The Minnesota law provides a narrower
religious exemption limited to "a religious
or fraternal corporation, association, or
society, with respect to qualifications
based on religion or sexual orientation,
when religion or sexual orientation shall
be a bona fide occupational qualification
for employment." ^ ^
In neither Massachusetts nor Minne-
sota are purely secular employers entitled
to a constitutional exemption on grounds
of free exercise of religion. Indeed, in cases
arising under the Minneapolis civil rights
ordinance, the Minnesota courts have
made clear that secular employers are not
entitled to discriminate on the basis of
statutorily identified characteristics
merely because the secular employer (in
those cases, health clubs) has personal re-
ligious beliefs inimical to homosexuality.^^
However, in a housing discrimination
case, a California Court of Appeal has
ruled that a secular landlord may invoke
the free exercise of religion to deny hous-
ing to an unmarried heterosexual couple
based on the landlord's religious convic-
tions, despite a state law barring marital
status discrimination in housing. The case
is on appeal to the California Supreme
Court.25
Even in those jurisdictions where sexual
orientation discrimination laws do not
provide express exemptions on religious
grounds, it is likely that they will be inter-
preted to require such exemptions for re-
ligious employers. The San Francisco
municipal ordinance was so interpreted in
1980, when a church discharged an organ-
ist on grounds of homosexuality.^^ The
2' See, e.g., Konarski v. New York Medical College, 124
LC II 57,197 (N.Y. Sup.Ct., N.Y. Co. 1985), a f fd without
opinion, 513 N.Y.S.2d 905 (App. Div., 1st Dep t . 1987), cert,
denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988).
22 395 Mass. 715 ,481 N . E . 2d 1160 (1985).
23 Minn. Stat . Sec. 363.02(1X2) (1993).
'"' Blanding v. Sports Si Health Club, Inc., 373 N.W.2d
784 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), a f fd without opinion, 389
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N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 1986); Potter v. LaSalle Sports &
Health Club, 384 N.W.2d 873 (Minn. 1986).
2^  Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing Commis-
sion, 1 Cal.App.4th 387, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 32 (Ct. App., 2nd
Dist. 1991), rev. granted, Feb. 27, 1992.
2* Walker v. First Presbyterian Church, 22 FEP 762 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1980).
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New Jersey state law, which has religious
exemption language that is not ideally
clear, was challenged by the Orthodox
Presbyterian church shortly after enact-
ment. The church contended that the am-
biguous religious exemption might subject
it to burdensome litigation to establish its
right to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation in its employment and public
accommodation activities. Ruling on a re-
quest for a preliminary injunction against
the law taking effect, the federal district
court noted the state attorney general's
disavowal of any intent to enforce the law
against the church, suggesting that such
abstention by the state would be appro-
priate in light of free exercise concerns,
and denied temporary relief.^ ^ A similar
challenge to the Hawaii law was dismissed
as premature, because no enforcement ac-
tions had been brought against the relig-
ious employer.^
Another area of controversy in the em-
ployment of lesbians, gay men and bisexu-
als is jobs involving contact with children.
The Minnesota statute specifically ex-
empts from coverage private "service or-
ganization[s] whose primary function is
providing occasional services to minors,
such as youth sports organizations, scout-
ing organizations, boys' or girls' clubs,
programs providing friends, counselors, or
role models for minors, youth theater,
dance, music or artistic organizations, ag-
ricultural organizations for minors, and
other youth organizations, with respect to
qualifications of employees or volunteers
based on sexual orientation." ^^  This does
not mean that the state requires exclusion
of gays from such jobs, but rather that the
state will not intervene to protect gays
who are excluded.
A New Hampshire legislative proposal
to ban employment of lesbians and gay
men in child care facilities was held un-
constitutional by the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court, which found no rational
basis to support the role model theory on
which the legislation was premised.^" In
the same opinion, the court upheld a ban
on lesbians or gay men becoming adoptive
or foster parents. Thus, a court not in-
clined to be overly protective of the rights
of gay people was, nonetheless, persuaded
that lesbians and gay men presented no
particular danger to the welfare of chil-
dren who would come into contact with
them in the context of "occasional ser-
vices" rendered by "service organiza-
tions." The rationality of Minnesota's
exclusion is thus subject to question.
What is the Experience Under Sexual
Orientation Laws?
There are few reported court decisions
construing or applying laws banning dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. Most of the reported decisions have
to do with claims by particular employers
that they are exempt from the laws. The
lack of officially published cases may be
due to several factors: first, that most of
the laws are too new to have generated a
significant body of appellate cases; sec-
ond, that most of the laws are enforced by
administrative agencies that specialize in
mediating and resolving discrimination
charges short of litigation and those agen-
cies frequently achieve settlements satis-
factory to the parties; third, that officials
responsible for selecting court decisions
for publication are occasionally squeamish
about lesbian and gay issues and avoid
selecting such cases for publication.
(A surprising number of significant de-
cisions on gay issues are not officially pub-
lished, especially in jurisdictions where
trial court decisions, if published, are done
so on a highly selective basis, such as New
York and California. Squeamishness may
be the explanation for lack of official pub-
2^  Presbytery of New Jersey of the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church V. Florio, No. 92-02641 (D.N.J. 1992) (not officially
published).
2* Voluntary Association v. Waihee, 800 F.Supp. 882
(D.Haw. 1992).
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29 Minn. Stat. Sec. 363.02(0(3) (1993).
3° Opinion of the Justices, 525 A.2d 1095 (N.H. 1987).
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lication in Dillon v. Frank,^^ an important
case of first impression on the appellate
level concerning workplace harassment of
employees perceived as gay,)
In addition, many lesbians and gay
men who encounter workplace discrimina-
tion may not file charges because they are
not fully "out of the closet" and fear the
possible notoriety of litigation. While
some jurisdictions allow such complain-
ants to proceed on an anonymous basis,
some others do not, which can be a signifi-
cant deterrent for those who wish to avoid
future discrimination by concealing their
sexual orientation from potential employ-
ers and coworkers.
Perhaps the most noteworthy discrimi-
nation ruling under a sexual orientation
law is the case of Collins v. Shell Oil
Company,^^ brought under Section 1101
of the California Labor Code, Jeffrey Col-
lins was a respected executive at Shell Oil
Company, He was discharged after a sec-
retarial employee found a sheet of paper
Collins had left in a photocopying ma-
chine, describing the rules for a "safe sex"
party he was planning to host with some
friends. The trial judge found that holding
such a party was a form of political activ-
ity within the meaning of Section 1101 as
construed by the California Supreme
Court in the Gay Law Students case, and
assessed compensatory and punitive dam-
ages against the employer in the amount
of approximately $5 million. The pending
case of Smedley v. Capps, Staples, Ward,
Hastings & Dodson, discussed at the be-
ginning of this article, will give the Cali-
fornia courts an opportunity to clarify
further the extent of employee activity
protected under Section 1101,
Other Sources of Workplace
Protection
Sexual orientation discrimination laws
are not the only source of protection
against discrimination for lesbian, gay.
and bisexual employees. Public employees
may also have constitutional and civil ser-
vice protection. Union-represented em-
ployees may find protection under
collective bargaining agreements. Marital
status discrimination laws in many juris-
dictions may also apply to certain situa-
tions where unmarried lesbian and gay
employees encounter unequal treatment.
Public employment was one of the first
areas where courts began to develop a
theoretical basis for protection against
discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation. Just days after the Stonewall
Rebellion in New York City that
launched the modern lesbian and gay lib-
eration movement in June 1969, the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled in Nor-
ton V. Macy ^^ that the due process clause
was offended when a federal agency dis-
charged a closeted gay employee who had
been arrested for sexual solicitation while
off duty.
The employee, a military veteran em-
ployed as a budget analyst by the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space
Administration, was discharged on two
grounds: that the conduct leading to his
arrest was "immoral, indecent, and dis-
graceful" and that his admission of past
homosexual conduct indicated that he had
"traits of character and personality which
render him , ,, unsuitable for further gov-
ernment employment," The court held
that the agency bore the burden of show-
ing that the employee's conduct had some
rational relationship to his fitness for ser-
vice and that mere assertions of moral
disapproval were insufficient for this pur-
pose. The decision, accompanied by sev-
eral others over the next few years,
eventually led to reconsideration of fed-
eral government policies, resulting in
adoption of the view that homosexuality,
as such, was not a barrier to civilian gov-
ernment service. This was confirmed as
" 58 EPD II 41,332 (6th Cir, 1992),
3257 EPD 1140,907, 1991 WL 147364 (Cal,Super,Ct,,
1991),
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mandatory in 1987, when a federal court
ruled in Swift v. United States^* that
exclusion of civilians from federal service
solely on the basis of sexual orientation,
without any job-related justification, also
violated the equal protection requirement
of the 5th Amendment,
In 1992, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development concluded a col-
lective bargaining agreement that in-
cluded a ban on anti-gay discrimination
within the agency, and similar bans were
adopted administratively by the Secretar-
ies of Agriculture and Transportation
early in the Clinton Administration.
Federal employment in the non-civilian
sector has proven a more difficult consti-
tutional issue. In the wake of Bowers v.
Hardwick, many federal courts have
taken the view that deferral to the con-
cerns of military and security agencies
(FBI, CIA, NSA) is the appropriate
course, rejecting a variety of constitu-
tional challenges to the exclusion of gays
from employment in those institutions. As
political leaders debated whether and how
to implement President Clinton's pledge
to remove the ban on service by openly
gay people in the military during 1993,
several court challenges were in progress,
including a case in which the Supreme
Court refused to review a decision by the
Ninth Circuit that would require the De-
fense Department at trial to provide a
better justification for its ban than the
one it had been providing, i.e., that gays
could not serve because non-gay troops
would not tolerate them,^^ Some doubt
was cast on this ruling, however, by the
Court's end-of-term decision in St. Mary's
Honor Center v.
Labor arbitrators have occasionally had
to rule on claims of unjust dismissal
brought by gay employees under typical
just-cause provisions of collective bargain-
ing agreements. Arbitrators have nor-
mally applied the well established rule
that conduct off the job, such as homosex-
ual conduct, cannot constitute just cause
for discharge unless the employer can
prove a significant adverse impact on its
business by retention of the employee.
Thus, where a male airline flight attend-
ant was charged with improper sexual ad-
vances to a young male employee at a
hotel where the flight crew was staying,
the arbitrator ordered reinstatement be-
cause the airline failed to show that con-
tinued employment of the now-repentant
employee would damage its business in
any way,^'' Similarly, an arbitrator found
no cause for discharge of a grocery clerk
for taking part in a lesbian party during
off-hours.-'®
About twenty states ban employment
discrimination on the basis of marital sta-
tus. While marital status and sexual ori-
entation discrimination claims are
conceptually quite distinct, the ban on
same-sex marriage maintained by all the
states means that any policy denying ben-
efits to unmarried employees with same-
sex partners who live in emotionally and
financially interdependent relationships
similar to married employees may be sub-
ject to challenge on grounds of marital
status discrimination. While such claims
have not been uniformly successful, they
are being made with increasing fervor,
and at least one appellate court has con-
cluded that they are plausible claims de-
serving of a full airing at trial. In Gay
Teachers Association v. New York City
Board of Education,^^ the court accepted
the argument that the plaintiffs, pro-
testing the ineligibility of their domestic
partners for inclusion on the school sys-
tem's employee benefit plans on the same
basis as employee spouses, had stated a
valid cause of action under a state law
^ 42 FEP 787 (D,D,C, 1987),
35 Pruitt V. Cheney, 943 F,2d 989 (9th Cir, 1991), cert,
denied, 113 S,Ct, 655 (1992),
3^  No, 92-602, 1993 Westlaw 220265 (U,S,, June 25,
1993),
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3' Hughes Air Corporation & Association of Flight Attend-
ants, 73 LA 148 (Barsamian, Arb,, 1979),
38 Ralphs Grocery Co. & Retail Clerks Union, 77 LA 867
(Kaufman, Arb,, 1981),
3» 585 N,Y,S,2d 1016 (App,Div,, 1st Dept, 1992),
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forbidding marital status discrimination
and a city ordinance forbidding both mar-
ital status and sexual orientation discrimi-
nation. Private sector employers are
probably immune from such suits because
of preemption of state and local civil
rights statutes by the federal pension and
benefits laws (which do not apply to pub-
lic sector employee benefit plans), but
proposals floating around Congress to
tinker with the preemption provisions
may open up this new field for litigation
in the future.
Although Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ^ does not cover sexual orien-
tation, either expressly or by interpreta-
tion, several courts have accepted the
view that same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable under the quid pro quo the-
ory,'*' Under this theory, both gay and
non-gay employees who suffer unwanted
sexual advances from other employees or
supervisors may find legal protection. On
the other hand, federal courts have re-
fused to extend the hostile environment
theory of sexual harassment under Title
VII to situations in which employees suf-
fer such harassment because they are per-
ceived to be gay,'*^ The courts have
reasoned that the quid pro quo theory
proceeds on the ground that the employee
was harassed because of his or her gender,
while the hostile environment theory fails
to proceed because the harassment is due
to sexual orientation rather than gender.
Of course, if gay employees suffer dis-
crimination because they are perceived as
having AIDS, being at risk for AIDS, or
associating with persons with AIDS, they
may seek protection under the Americans
With Disabilities Act (ADA) *^ and simi-
lar state laws. As its express language,
legislative history and interpretive regula-
tions make clear, the ADA was not in-
tended to ban discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, per se, but if AIDS
is a motivation for discrimination, the dis-
criminatee is protected, regardless of his
or her sexual orientation.
Apart from constitutional or statutory
causes of action, lesbian and gay employ-
ees may also be protected by voluntarily
adopted employer non-discrimination pol-
icies, contained in work place rules, per-
sonnel manuals and employee handbooks
which, in many states, are treated as part
of an enforceable contract of employment.
Such policies first began to be adopted by
major corporations in the 1970s in re-
sponse to surveys of large companies un-
dertaken by the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force, Many more such pol-
icies were adopted during the 1980s by
employers determined to show support for
employees battling the AIDS epidemic or
responding to the recommendations of
professional societies or accrediting orga-
nizations. For example, early in the 1990s
many law schools adopted non-discrimina-
tion policies in response to adoption of a
non-discrimination by-law by the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools, In some
cases, the policies were accompanied by
voluntary recognition of employees' do-
mestic partners for purposes of benefits
entitlements. While some of these policies
were not legally binding, they created an
atmosphere in which employee complaints
of discrimination might be taken seriously
by company managers, even in the ab-
sence of legal intervention.
Conclusion
Over the past quarter century, the law
has taken great strides in extending pro-
tection against discrimination in employ-
ment to lesbians and gay men, a group
totally bereft of legal recognition at the
beginning of this period. While compre-
hensive federal coverage does not yet ex-
ist, the debate on service by gays in the
*" 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e (1991).
•" Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transportation. 597 F.Supp. 537
(M.D.Ala. 1983), affirmed without published opinion, 749
F.2d 732 (Uth Cir, 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth
Services. 511 F.Supp, 307 (N,D.I11. 1981).
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"2 Dillon V. Frank. 952 F,2d 403 (table), 58 EPD H 41,332
(6th Cir. 1992); Carreno v. Local 2261.B.E.W.. 54 FEP 81
(D. Kan. 1990).
"3 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101-12213 (1990).
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military suggests that the time is soon
coming when there will be a national con-
sensus to forbid sexual orientation dis-
crimination, at least in civilian
employment. This conclusion arises from
the tenor of the debate, in which even
many conservative commentators agree
that sexual orientation discrimination in
employment is wrong, but contend that
the special circumstances of the military
make it justifiable in that sphere.
Meanwhile, a large minority of the pop-
ulation either lives in states or localities
where sexual orientation discrimination is
unlawful or works for employers bound by
express or implicit policies of non-discrim-
ination, imposed either by constitutional
mandate, administrative fiat, or well-es-
tablished policy. At the rate new sexual
orientation laws are being enacted by
states and localities, it seems that cover-
age of a majority of employers is not far
off, so this is an issue as to which labor
relations practitioners need to be well-
informed,
[The End]
Jury Award Reduced in ADA Suit
A jury award of $572,000 in the EEOC's first lawsuit under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act was reduced to $222,000 by the federal
district court in Chicago, Statutory caps on compensatory and punitive dam-
ages required the reduction (EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 61
EPD If 42,289), The defendant violated the ADA by firing an employee
because he had terminal brain cancer, despite the fact that he was still able to
perform the essential functions of the job at the time of the firing. The EEOC
unsuccessfully sought to have the $200,000 cap applied separately to the
compensatory and punitive awards, but the court ruled that the statute
applies the cap to both awards combined.
The EEOC also argued unsuccessfully that the cap applies only to
businesses, not to business owners sued as individuals. The court rejected the
defendant's argument that the $50,000 compensatory award was excessive.
However, the award of $500,000 for punitive damage was excessive, the court
ruled, lowering it to $150,000 and bringing the combined awards to the
statutory limit of $200,000 (the statute prohibits informing juries of the limit
in order to avoid influencing their deliberations). The award of $22,000 in
back pay was not affected by the cap.
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